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Introduction

1. The question of propaganda during peacetime plays a very important role, if not the chief role, thus, a well-formulated political propaganda in time will bring more profit (advantage or usefulness) than the atom bomb. During World War II and in subsequent years, the Soviet Government considerably strengthened its propaganda and agitation among its people, especially in the army. This is evident merely from the fact that in all educational institutions, factories, and even in apartment house administrations, obligatory study of "Short Course in History of Comparty" and other such political literature has been introduced. In the army the political apparatus has been increased in size.
2. Before the Central Committee of Comparty stands the very important task aimed at involvement of the people, not only as a working force, but also in their conscience. For this are used all possible means: schools, movies, theater, press, radio, and even the church. Methods and forms of Soviet propaganda are generally known; and in this article I don't have the purpose of describing them in detail. Before me there is another task: to describe the general traits of American propaganda directed toward the USSR and especially toward Soviet occupation forces, showing in this connection to what extent it (American propaganda) is able to counteract Soviet propaganda under existing conditions of the mighty iron curtain.

Open (overt) Methods of Propaganda

3. The fact of the existence of the so-called iron curtain between USA and USSR does not permit effective utilization of press and radio as means of propaganda.
4. Among overt methods of propaganda being: radio (Voice of America), and the illustrated magazine, America. Neither of them is accessible to the broad masses of the Soviet people. Listening to Voice of America broadcasts is forbidden and, therefore, the ~~broadcasts~~ are jammed by special equipment. The magazine America is disseminated in the USSR in very restricted quantity and among a certain circle of people. The content of the magazine, in essence, amounts only to description of life in America, with most of its space devoted

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to articles about science and technology and not at all to political questions. The Voice of America Broadcasts are not outstanding for their difference in content from America magazine. There is a feeling of democracy. The majority of the radio broadcasts are devoted to all sorts of production figures and processes but not one word about methods for struggle by the people against the Soviet Government. But the Soviet people know about the "good life" in America and they would like to hear something else, namely, about paths of struggle for freedom, about destruction of the political arbitrary regime in the country. That is what should be the basis of American propaganda for the USSR. Can it be considered that the Voice of American and the magazine, America, which penetrate the iron curtain to a certain extent, justify their purpose (or mission) in the matter of propagandizing revolutionary ideas in the struggle of the people against the Soviet authorities? Of course, it is not possible to say that. And this is very apparent, not only to the people of Russia but also beyond its borders.

5. It is not possible to ask a great deal from the magazine, America, because its content is decided in advance and is agreed with the Soviet Government. But the radio? It is not subject to any kind of political censorship by the USSR. However, here also is not felt real propaganda language.
6. In order to achieve the desired results on the ideological front and win the political struggle, it is necessary to counteract Soviet propaganda with all possible measures, to crowd it out of the mass of the people and put in its place a propaganda which would help the people strengthen their belief in a popular liberation struggle in the USSR.
7. From the accessible and open means of propaganda under the conditions of the iron curtain at the present time, although they encounter various difficulties such as jamming of radio broadcasts, restriction on dissemination of the magazine, America, and its continual political censorship by the USSR, all the same it is desirable to expect more. And for this there is a basis, and consequently a possibility. Such are my general views on content of American overt propaganda for the USSR.

Means of Covert Propaganda.

8. As for the question of American propaganda for Soviet occupation forces, especially in Germany, here the chief role is to be played by the covert, mostly individual, method of solving this problem. A large part in propaganda to the USSR can be assigned to the Russian emigration. It has available all means necessary for this purpose: organization with excellent cadres (staff) press, radio station, etc. However, the propaganda penetrates to the other side rarely, and even then not to the persons who should get it.

personnel in Eastern Germany are unable to boast that they at any time saw a newspaper or pamphlet distributed among the Soviet forces or the local population. Being in western Germany and becoming acquainted with the emigre press and the volume of its circulation, it occurred to me how fine it would be if all this mass of newspapers, magazines, etc. of the emigre political literature did not remain on this side but could be distributed behind the iron curtain.

9. True, attempts in this direction are being made. But unfortunately, as of now, this problem has not been solved completely. The Soviet Army in Germany as of now does not have proper contact and communication with the west. This is to be regretted.
10. It must be taken into account that distribution of forbidden literature among Soviet occupation personnel is accompanied by great difficulties. Counter-measures taken by the Soviet Government in this field are very serious. Strictness

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of the occupation regime (life), highly developed agent network of the MGB, party and Komsomol organizations, etc indeed are considered unconquerable barriers between two great countries, Russia and America. But this must not force us to turn aside from our intentions. Consequently, that which cannot be done directly or overtly must be done illegally. I do not know all the methods being used at the present time to throw words of truth across the iron curtain. But I have certain ideas on this subject which I would like to share. There is nothing special in these ideas, but they may be something unexpected on that side of the world.

- (1) It is necessary to conduct propaganda activity very carefully, keeping in mind the regime which has been established for Soviet military personnel in Eastern Germany. They are not permitted any contact with the local population. Military units are located at a great distance from interzonal borders. Exhibition of the least sympathy or friendliness for the West results in political terror, etc.
- (2) Work among Soviet Army personnel should have two directions:
 - (a) Active agitation, and
 - (b) Partial discrimination against individual officials.
- (3) Activity of individual emigrant groups should be considered useful at the time when the majority of their propaganda and literature gets to the other side of the iron curtain. Their work can be evaluated on the basis of the number of defectors.
- (4) Organization of proper reception of defectors and wide-scale propagandizing of such facts will give positive results. For the Army, a defection is the worst thing possible. Among the army leadership it is always subjected to serious political analysis.
- (5) In propaganda should be used truthful information on the current issues of the day -- issues which touch Soviet citizens in their daily life, eg, propaganda about great structures of Communism, etc. There are many themes which can exert much influence on Soviet military personnel. They are all dictated by the Soviet Government itself. In essence, in my opinion, it would be desirable to give a special place in propaganda to the following questions: Party dictatorship in USSR, Stalin is the bloody executioner of the people, the collective form "heaven," socialism in reality, etc. Everything which can be brought to the people cannot be enumerated, but most certainly the result will have such an appeal which will crush Stalin and his barbarous Communist party. In this no regard should be taken for personalities, and the language of the people itself should be used.
- (6) It is most important and most difficult to establish communication with the other side. On the basis of (my) experience and of reality I can propose the following possibilities:
 - (a) Creation in East Germany of widespread agent network with special task of propaganda. For this purpose, it is best to utilize the local population. The role of such representatives on the spot is tremendous. Here is an example of the results of the practical activities and a characterization of it:
 - (1) Military personnel, despite all regulations, seek acquaintance with German women. After several meetings, a situation of mutual trust is achieved. In such a case, spoken propaganda and written material such as leaflets become possible. As result of such an acquaintance, military personnel:
 - a. May be accused of living with German women, and hence, suffer all the consequences,
 - b. May make the decision to cross over to Western Germany with the German sweetheart on account of political convictions, and also on account of fear of accountability.

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- c. loss of documents, especially Party card, as result of contacts with German woman is reason for going over to West.
- (2) The German population is capable of furnishing those who desire to go to the west with vehicle transportation, civilian clothing, guides, and even with falsified documents. It is necessary to observe here that this question plays a basic role, and that such means must be taken into account in organizing flight (defection) of Soviet military personnel. Practice has shown that the overwhelming majority of defections to the west were accomplished successfully only with direct help from the Germans and that it is almost impossible to accomplish alone without aid. This fact is eloquently confirmed by the orders from the Soviet command on the occasions of attempted escapes to western Germany.
- (3) Dissemination of leaflets without communication (contact) with Soviet military personnel should be done as follows:
- a. In each military unit a certain number of German employees are working. Although as a rule they are informers to Special Sections, their loyalty to Soviet organs is very doubtful. They are completely capable of bringing letters onto the unit area and dropping them unobserved into the post box. As far as leaflets, that is more dangerous.
 - b. A German stops a Soviet military person on the road or street and hands him a letter allegedly dropped by a Russian and found by the German along the road. The duty of the Soviet military persons would be to send the letter to the addresses by dropping it into the first military mail box which he passes. (Note from translator: Author says he had such an experience once in East Germany himself and didn't suspect the German or the letter, that he merely dropped it into the nearest Soviet military mail box without even opening it. He cautions that such a method could not be used frequently in one area, that it would have to be used over widely separated areas).
 - c. At night it is not so difficult to drop leaflets on the territory of a unit. At dawn they will be gathered up by soldiers while officers are still sleeping.
 - d. A Soviet military person who has taken off his coat or clothes at a restaurant, theater, or beach may find a leaflet in his picket. Streetcars, autobusses, taxis, chance encounters with German women are convenient possibilities for transmittal of leaflets to interested persons.
 - e. Aerial balloons with leaflets can be effective only at a short distance, that is, when the objective (target) is visible. Otherwise, it is very difficult to calculate the point where they will fall.
 - f. Leaflets can be scattered (dropped) along the most probable routes for movements of military units, especially during field exercises, all the more so in view of the fact that such exercises are conducted, as a rule always in the same locality.
 - g. Firing ranges and training areas: at night whatever is desired may be dropped on them. At the beginning of the class day, the majority of the leaflets will be gathered up and will fall into dependable hands.

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- h. A truck driver returning to his unit brings in the body of his truck several bundles of leaflets, so to speak, direct to their address. It is very easy to throw a bundle of leaflets into a truck in traffic, and this is a completely safe method.
- i. A leaflet which has arrived in the hands of a soldier and which is written to his liking will replace dozens of other methods of dissemination. He will most certainly pass it on to his nearest friend and they will go over its contents in detail.

(4) Radio is an important form of communication for the troops.

Suitable broadcasts on the proper military wave lengths can be of interest to Soviet signal corps personnel. In this case the maximum effect can be achieved during the period of field exercises when comparatively more radio stations are in use, especially in tank and mobile units. It is necessary to remember that a stand-by radio station is in action continuously and that listening to other radio stations takes place in spite of the strictest restrictions.

There are very many methods of disseminating propaganda among Soviet occupation forces. I am not in position to describe all of them, and therefore have presented only those which are possible and practical and can be used under conditions existing there where our work is directed.

The conclusion to be drawn on this question is to increase the activity of organs involved in disseminating propaganda to the other side of the world, not taking into account the possibilities and means. In this I see very great significance in the solution of the problems dealt with above.

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